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1
The Brexit process and its impact on EU 
policies and institutions
Since the EU membership referendum of 23 June 2016, the United 
Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU has generated considerable interest 
among both researchers and public servants. Literature on the consequences 
of Brexit started to surge even before the referendum, and the momentum 
continues to this day. A common feature of all these contributions is that they 
have been producing estimates without knowing anything about how the future 
relationship between the EU and the UK will exactly look like. Hence, their 
tendency to focus on some headline outcomes like an X or Y percentage fall in 
economic growth, household income, foreign trade or business investment by a 
given year (typically by 2030). These papers derive from the assumption that the 
UK will, under any scenario, inevitably suffer as a result of Brexit. They usually 
consider three different scenarios: a “soft” one (Norway or Swiss model); a 
“hard” one (a fall back to WTO terms); and a “semi-hard exit” lying somewhere 
in between the two extremes (Dhingra et al. 2016; Schoof et al. 2015). 
Some early analyses of Brexit even contained guesses on both short- 
and long-term, the latter being devoted to the three above scenarios, while 
short-term guesses predicted economic uncertainties, holding back spending 
decisions and deterring FDI (Kierzenkowski et al. 2016). The least that can be 
said is that short-term guesses did not really come true. An illustrative example 
of the relationship between econometric models and reality was when the 
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Bank of England had to upgrade its forecasts for UK GDP growth for 2017 
signiÞ cantly for the second time in just six months, mainly due to resilience 
of consumer spending following the vote for Brexit. We can also bring up the 
analysis made by the Treasury in 2016 about the “immediate and profound 
shock” a mere vote to leave was to represent to the British economy, which has 
actually proved to be completely incorrect. 
Another type of literature that has developed since the Brexit vote consists 
of sectoral analyses, the authors of which (much like those responsible for 
general analyses) know nothing about the nature of the future relationship 
between the EU and the UK. But since they are based on the worst-case 
scenario, they have at least the advantage of giving serious warnings to 
decision-makers about the risks that a no-deal scenario would entail. For 
example, these papers reveal that among value-chains car industry would 
be one of the industries to be most seriously damaged by the introduction 
of WTO-tariffs in trade with the EU. Interestingly, it is not the British car 
industry that would suffer the most, but the German one which, by putting 
18,000 jobs at risk, “would see a sharp decline in its proÞ ts due to the 
pronounced sales slump in its premium brands” (Deloitte 2017). To mention 
another example, for the European meat industry a hard Brexit could “result 
in the loss of at least 32,000 jobs”. The UK being primarily a premium market, 
the magnitude of the shock could be much greater than the one caused by 
the Russian food import ban in 2014, as it would be more difÞ cult to Þ nd 
alternative markets for the diverted products (UECBV 2017).
In a different approach, one can Þ nd that studies have Þ rst focused on the 
reasons and the outcome of the referendum, afterwards what would Brexit 
entail for the British economy as a whole, and Þ nally sector-speciÞ c analyses. 
The area that has gained very little attention so far is the impact that the UK’s 
exit may possibly make on the EU’s institutions and policies. The aim of this 
study is to be a part of a remedy for this situation.
2.1. Brexit’s possible impact on the EU
Acknowledging that in order to assess the impact of Brexit on EU policies, 
“it is inadequate to simply take the UK out of the equation”, on the basis that 
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the behaviour of other actors will not change (de Ville, Siles-Brügge 2019), and 
given the fact that, at the time of writing this paper, there is yet no valid Þ nal 
agreement between the parties which creates a huge uncertainty surrounding 
the UK-EU future relationship (especially concerning trade), we are trying to 
draw some conclusions from facts, and facts alone.
According to the data for the year preceding the referendum (2015), the 
UK was the 5th largest economy in the world, and the second largest in the EU 
(IMF online). Brexit does not simply mean that one of the Member States (MS) 
has made use of the opportunity offered by Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, 
and kicked off the process of quitting the EU. It means that a country with 
an economic size equal to that of the smallest 18 to 20 MS wants to leave 
the integration (Figure 2.1). Although the situation has changed by 2018 – 
mostly because of the quick depreciation of the pound sterling vis-à-vis both 
the U.S. dollar and the Euro in the run-up to and following the referendum 
– the departure of the United Kingdom would still cause signiÞ cant economic 
damage and downsizing for the European Union. 
Figure 2.1. GDP at current market prices (EUR bn) 
in 2015 in 2018
Source: Eurostat 2019a (the striped columns indicate UK GDP in 2018 calculated at pound euro exchange 
rate 2015, as compared to the GDP of the 20 smallest EU MS).
With Brexit, the balance of power among the main groups of MS, and 
consequently, the orientation of the common policies will certainly change. 
Trade policy, in particular, may shift towards protectionism. While, under 
the Council’s qualiÞ ed majority voting system, currently both liberal and 
protectionist groups of MS are able to block decision-making, in the future, 
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with the loss of the UK’s vote, only the protectionist one will be able to 
continue to do so. Not only will this certainly affect Britain’s future access 
to the single market, but it will also have implications on how liberal all of 
EU’s future bilateral trade agreements with third countries would be. As one 
of the UK’s main inputs to the European project has always been pushing 
for trade liberalization, it is feared that Brexit might make the EU less open 
(Booth et al. 2015).
The other main issue, apart from trade policy implications, is budget, i.e. 
how Brexit will affect the European budget (direct impact), and the common 
policies which are based on it (indirect impact). Even if some argue that “the 
Þ nancial savings for the UK would be negligible and the impact on Member 
States would be manageable” (Nunez-Ferrer, Rinaldi 2016), Brexit could 
have serious consequences for the EU Þ nances. It should not be forgotten 
that the UK is the second largest net contributor to the common budget. Over 
the last 5 years (2014-2018), the UK’s average annual net contribution (after 
rebate) was EUR 9.56 billion (author’s own calculation based on Eurostat 
2019b), representing circa one Þ fth of all net contributions and one fourth of 
the total of net beneÞ ts – i.e. that part of the redistributed resources that can 
be allocated to particular MS. This amount is close to EUR 67 billion when 
projected over the normal 7-year budget period of the EU.
Brexit’s impact on EU policies can already be felt. The Commission’s draft 
proposals concerning the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 
2021-2027, published in May 2018, are based on the assumption of a clean/
hard Brexit – i.e. the UK not being part of either the customs union or the 
single market – and they do not include any contribution from the United 
Kingdom (European Commission 2018). In principle, there are two ways to 
make up for lost money – by cutting back expenditure on common policies or 
increasing MS contributions – and the draft proposals explore both. Spending 
on the two most important EU policies (agricultural and cohesion), which 
together currently account for more than 70% of the total, would be cut by 
5% at current prices (i.e. approximately 15-20% in real terms). A change to 
make the less developed MS of the EU periphery unhappy, since so far they 
could easily make good use of such programs (unlike other kinds, like research 
and innovation). So, while the MFF negotiations are already difÞ cult without 
taking Brexit into account, to make matters worse, the Commission (and the 
EP even more so) wants to increase the overall size of the budget. Nevertheless, 
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the Germans (who’s natural allies in this Þ eld are the Austrians, the Danes, the 
Dutch and the Swedes) were quick to indicate that the Commission’s proposal 
would cause their annual net balance vis-a-vis the EU budget to rise by an 
average of circa EUR 15 billion, which they thought would be unrealistic 
(Federal Ministry of Finance 2018). Certainly the distribution struggles within 
the EU-27 over both funds and charges are getting even Þ ercer (Becker 2019).
Concerning other consequences of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU 
on European, policies and institutions we can mention that the European 
Medicines Agency has already been moved to Amsterdam and the European 
Banking Authority to Paris. Also, the Council presidency order had been revised 
(i.e. brought forward by six months) after the UK’s decision to relinquish the 
Council presidency in the second half of 2017. Furthermore, without the 
ability to rely on Britain’s military power, diplomatic network, intelligence 
capabilities and other soft power competencies EU’s foreign policy would be 
less inß uential at the world stage. So, Brexit is likely to undermine the EU’s 
prospect for becoming a leading global actor (Patel, Reh 2016). Finally, there 
is a risk of “contagion”, a dread of Brussels’ bureaucracy. Hence, their strategy 
to avoid the precedent of an easy withdrawal, lest other MS follow suit. This 
leads us to our other main topic, the Brexit negotiations. 
2.2. Lessons from the negotiation process 
The decision to leave the EU made by the British people in June 2016 had 
caused panic throughout the (economic-political-media-scholar/adviser) elites 
of both Britain and the EU27, as they felt that Brexit, whatever form it would 
take, was going to hurt their interests. In order to avoid such a scenario they 
started by launching a widespread campaign to frighten people with the likely 
negative consequences of Brexit well before the referendum. 
Part of this strategy was to develop a Brexit-related narrative. The notions 
of “soft” and “hard” Brexit have been widely used in the media – but also in the 
institutional and scientiÞ c community – the former referring to a combination 
of maintaining single market (and/or customs union) membership with UK 
control on migration from the EU, while the latter meaning leaving without 
a deal and falling on WTO terms concerning the future trade relations. In 
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reality, it would be more accurate to call these scenarios as a “messy” or 
“clean” Brexit. A messy Brexit, apart from being totally unacceptable to the 
EU – as undermining the core principle of indivisibility of the four freedoms – 
would mean that the UK law remains under the jurisdiction of the European 
court of Justice, billions in annual payments to the common budget continue, 
and practically no meaningful trade agreements with third countries can be 
concluded. And, to crown it all, the UK would have no say in the future of the 
EU policies, rules and regulations. On the contrary, under a clean Brexit, the 
UK would regain control over laws, borders and money, and also the ability 
to conclude free trade agreements with third countries, including the EU 
(Halligan, Lyons 2018).
The negotiations followed the agenda set by the EU, Þ rst discussing issues 
which were of importance to the EU (citizens’ rights, Irish border, Þ nancial 
settlement). In other words, the British were to accept paying the EUR 45 
billion exit check without even knowing what market access they would get in 
return. Even worse was the artiÞ cial magniÞ cation of the importance of the 
Irish border issue, which has become a trap: either Northern Ireland (or the 
UK as a whole) would remain in the EU customs union, or the permeability 
of the land border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and 
hence the peace process, would be jeopardized. 
Subsequent delays in the Brexit process were eventually caused by a split 
within the Conservative Party, when a growing number of ministers (two of 
them chief negotiators) had realized they had been bypassed by the Prime 
Minister in her consultations with the European Commission. The deal 
brought home from Brussels by the May government has then been rejected 
three times by the House of Commons (on 15 January 2019, on 12 March 
2019, and on 29 March 2019), especially because of the unacceptability of the 
so-called backstop arrangements. The arrangements were to come into force 
in the absence of a trade deal at the end of the transition period and would 
have created a single EU-UK customs territory from which the UK could not 
have withdrawn unilaterally (see Article 20 of the Irish Protocol). The absence 
of a clause allowing withdrawal on notice is unprecedented in trade treaties 
(Howe 2018). Indeed, the original protocol would have resulted in a trap: if 
there is no agreement, the UK could have remained indeÞ nitely in the EU 
customs union which would have prevented her from beneÞ ting from one of 
Brexit’s most important beneÞ ts, i.e. to conclude mutually beneÞ cial bilateral 
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trade agreements with third countries. Although the Johnson government, 
which replaced the May government in mid-July 2019, has, in this respect, 
signiÞ cantly improved the deal, the uncertainty surrounding the Brexit 
process, especially the EU-UK future trade relations, has not yet disappeared.
*     *     *
The foundation of democracy is that the minority accepts to be ruled by the 
majority. The real problem with Brexit is that politicians and the establishment 
in general (both in the UK and the EU) have never accepted the verdict of 
the British people in the referendum. So far, they have done everything to 
frustrate, stop, reverse, or at least slow down the process. 
The 2016 referendum on Brexit had the largest popular vote ever (17.4 
million people voted to leave) in the UK. The constituency make-up of votes – 
406 Leave constituencies versus 224 Remain constituencies – was even more 
astonishing. If this had been a General Election, a majority of 164 would 
have emerged, meaning a very strong government, like the Þ rst two Blair 
Governments were (majorities of 179, 167) and not rivalled by any other since 
World War 2 (Llewelyn 2019). 
In the UK Parliament, however, Remainers have always outnumbered 
Leavers – just as in publicly broadcasted debates Europhiles have always 
outnumbered Eurosceptic panelists1. In today’s Britain, Brexit is no longer 
about whether it is worth leaving the EU, but about restoring democracy. For 
the sake of both the UK and the EU, the best would be to compromise on a 
real, mutually advantageous deal on future trade relations. 2
Abstract 
The present paper focuses on two main areas: Þ rst, it seeks to assess the impact 
of British withdrawal on various common policies (like trade policy and common 
budget) and institutions; second, it draws attention to the fact that the way in which 
Article 50 negotiations were conducted in itself provides a great deal of insight into 
1 An analysis of the composition of panels for two key BBC programmes (Any Questions and Question 
Time) found that Leave supporters had been greatly under-represented in the period from June 2016 to 
December 2017. Balancing on the basis of whether panellists voted for Leave or Remain, both 
programmes favoured Remain by about 68% to 32% (IEA 2018).
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the very functioning of today’s EU. The process suffers from a multitude of problems 
which have largely contributed to the fact that criticisms about the EU proved to be 
justiÞ ed in the eyes of a signiÞ cant part of the British society, ever more determined to 
quit. Against this background, the future of the EU depends, to a large extent, on the 
ability to draw the right lessons from Brexit and Þ nd the best ways to move forward. 
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